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Municipal Industrial Development Bonds
Alfred E. Abbey*
The number and the monetary size of industrial development bonds
attest to the success of this means of attracting industry to a particular
municipality. Mr. Abbey here discusses the development of the various
types of industrial aid bonds, the provisions of the enabling legislation,
the legal instruments involved, and the problems encountered.
Several years ago a national business magazine carried an article
styled "You Gotta Have A Golf Course."' The article outlined the
efforts of a small town to attract new industry and the awkward
realization by the city fathers that they were losing out to the competi-
tion because their community lacked such a recreational facility. After
this finding, several public spirited citizens raised the necessary funds
and constructed a nine-hole course. These efforts were soon rewarded
when a large industrial concern located a new manufacturing plant in
their city. Industrial development bonds are essentially intended to
serve the same purpose as this golf course, and, at least from the
point of view of the issuer, this paper could be sub-titled "You Gotta
Have the Money."
One of, the principal problems facing any industrial concern that
may be considering the addition of a new facility is financing the cost
of this venture. Therefore, when the municipality concerned present'
a ready-made and expense-saving solution to this problem, a major
obstacle is cleared and the relative bargaining position of the munici-
pality is proportionately increased. In recent years, and with a marked
increase during the past decade, many states have authorized their
counties and municipalities to issue "industrial development bonds"
for the declared purpose of providing increased and more diversified
employment.
2
Various studies have been made on the factors affecting an industry's
choice of a new location and almost all have reached the conclusion
that municipal financing is far surpassed by such economic factors as
the availability of labor, raw materials, transportation, and similar
important considerations to the sound location of any manufacturing
* Assistant General Counsel, Life and Casualty Insurance Company of Tennessee.
This article is a revision of a paper presented by the author to The Association of
Life Insurance Counsel, May 7, 1963. Portions reprinted are with permission of The
Association of Life Insurance Counsel, copyright, 1965.
1. Business Week, June 25 1955, p. 86.
2. See CamaBE OF COMMERCE OF THE UNITED STATES, WHAT NEw INDUSTRIAL
JOBS MEAN TO A CommuNrry (1963).
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plant.3 However, such studies may be somewhat misleading since
municipal financing is now available in many locations and therefore
will not be a major factor affecting the choice of any particular city,
or even any particular state. Consider the example of the town that
did not have a golf course. Several cities competing for the new
industry offered industrial aid financing, but the final choice of location
was based on the availability of an adult recreational facility. On the
other hand, the availability of industrial aid financing may well have
been the most decisive factor affecting the primary decision of the
company, i.e., whether it would add a new plant in any location.
Judging by the rapid growth in both the number and size of the issues
that have been marketed, it would appear that industrial development
bonds have been successful in achieving their stated purpose.4
The purpose of this paper will be to discuss the development of
the various types of industrial aid bonds, the provisions of the
enabling legislation, the legal instruments involved, and some of the
problems that may be encountered.
I. LEGISLATVE DEVELOPMENT
In basic form, industrial development bonds are municipal bonds
issued to finance a city's acquisition of a suitable site and the con-
struction of an industrial building thereon. Under the terms of firm
contracts made prior to the sale of the bonds, this facility will be leased
to a private industrial concern with rentals at least sufficient to cover
the debt service and all costs connected with the bond issue. The
bonds are secured by a pledge of the rentals and, in most cases, by
a mortgage on all property acquired or constructed with the proceeds
of the bonds. In some states, the full faith and credit of the munici-
pality involved may be pledged to the payments of the bonds, or they
may be additionally secured by a pledge of surplus revenues from
other municipal projects.5
3. See, e.g., Bergin & Eagan, How Effective are Industrial Development Programs?
Mich. Bus. Rev., Jan. 1960.
4. Total issues were variously estimated at $200,000,000 through 1961, but this
figure is no longer of real significance in view of several very large issues of more
recent date. The amount is still small by comparison with a total state and municipal
debt of $80,000,000,000 on June 30, 1962, and issues during 1962 in excess of
$8,000,000,000. MOODY, MuNicnAL & Gov'T MANuAL 16-19 (1963).
5. Throughout this paper, reference is made to powers granted to cities or municipal-
ities. The same authority has usually been granted to counties and other political
subdivisions, and frequently two or more governmental units are authorized to act in
concert. For an interesting application where two distinct bond issues were made
under separate enactments to finance the same project, see Wayland v. Snapp, 232
Ark. 57, 334 S.W.2d 633 (1960).
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A. Tax Supported Bonds
The grandfather of modern day legislation authorizing the issuance
of industrial development bonds was an emergency measure enacted
in Mississippi in 1936 and designed to help relieve the acute economic
distress of the depression. This statute, known as the "Balance
Agriculture with Industry Law,"6 authorized the municipalities of that
state to acquire suitable land, to construct commercial, industrial,
agricultural and manufacturing enterprises, and to operate the com-
pleted enterprise. Prior to exercising such powers, the municipality
was required to obtain a certificate of public convenience and neces-
sity from the Mississippi Agricultural and Industrial Board created
under the act. This Board was directed to investigate the proposed
undertaking and to issue the requisite certificate upon finding that
sufficient natural resources were available, that a specified labor
supply was available, and that the total outstanding bonds did not
exceed certain limits. Before authorizing any municipality to actually
operate the enterprise, the Board was further required to find that,
said enterprise is well conceived, has a reasonable prospect of success, will
provide proper economic development and employment, and will add
materially to the general welfare of the municipality, and will not become
a burden upon the taxpayers of the municipality.7
The city was also required to hold a special election in which
the ballot would contain a brief statement of the plan and the voters
would be given an opportunity to indicate whether they were "for
the proposed enterprise" or "against the proposed enterprise." The
act required that two-thirds of those voting approve the plan and that
at least a majority of the qualified electors in the municipality shall
have voted. After obtaining the approval of the Board and the
electorate, the city was authorized to finance the enterprise by the
use of any available funds and by the issuance of general obligation
bonds pledging the full faith and credit of the municipality to their
payment. Almost incidentally, the act empowered the Board to
authorize the municipality to sell, lease or otherwise dispose of any
enterprise thus acquired. All income from any such lease or funds
received on any other disposition of the project were to be paid into
a special sinking fund and used solely for the retirement of the bonds.
In the first test case under the Mississippi act, the proposed bond
issue was 35 thousand dollars. This humble beginning can be com-
pared with a revenue bond issue of 50 million dollars recently ap-
proved in Kentucky. The original Mississippi enactment provided for
6. Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 8936-24 (1956) (as re-enacted).
7. Miss. CODE ANN. § 8936-08 (1956).
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a life of four years from 1936. It was extended in 1940, and re-
enacted in permanent form in 1944.
B. Revenue Bonds
There was no further legislation in this field until the end of World
War II, when, in 1946, revenue bonds, payable solely from the rents
derived from the particular project, were authorized in Kentucky.8
As distinguished from the earlier Mississippi legislation allowing a
municipality to operate the plant, the Kentucky act specifically
provides that the plant must be leased to an industrial concern. The
Kentucky act does not provide for submission of the proposed under-
taking to a state board nor for voter approval, and the only require-
ment is that there shall be a municipal ordinance specifying the es-
sential features of the particular undertaking.
While almost all subsequent legislation on this subject, particularly
those acts directing the use of revenue bonds, provide that the bonds
may be secured by a mortgage on the project, the Kentucky act
provides only for a pledge of the income and revenue from the in-
dustrial building. In the event of default in the payment of principal
or interest on any bond, a receiver may be appointed to administer
the project.
C. Local Development Corporations
Another new form was introduced by a 1949 Alabama act pro-
viding for the creation of local development corporations which issue
their own bonds to finance the acquisition of new industrial facilities.9
These corporations are formed under the specific provisions of this
act and not under the general corporation laws of the state. Any three
or more natural persons are authorized to apply to the governing body
of the municipality for permission to form an industrial development
corporation. After the governing body has approved the certificate
of incorporation by appropriate resolution, the certificate is filed with
the probate judge of the county in which the municipality is located
and the applicants are then constituted a public corporation.
All powers of the corporation are vested in a board of directors
of not less than seven members, each of whom must be a duly
qualified elector and taxpayer in the municipality. The act provides
that the directors shall serve without compensation, that they shall
be elected by the governing body, and, if possible, chosen from the
membership of the local chamber of commerce or similar civic organi-
zations. The act also specifies that any corporation so formed shall
8. Ky. REV. STAT. §§ 103.200-85 (1963).
9. ALA. CODE tit. 37, §§ 815-30(1) (1958).
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be a non-profit enterprise; that all earnings shall be paid to the
municipality after sufficient provision is made for payment of the
bonds and other obligations of the corporation; and that, upon dissolu-
tion, the title to all corporate funds and property -shall be immediately
vested in the municipality. The expression of legislative intent states
that the corporation may not operate the project. All bonds issued by
the corporation are payable solely out of the revenues and receipts
derived from the leasing and sale of its projects. The bonds may be
secured by a pledge of revenues and a mortgage on all or any part of
the projects. There is no requirement for the approval of any state
board or agency nor for a municipal election. After the corporation
has been formed, the nature and scope of its projects and the bonds
to be issued need be approved only by its board of directors meeting
in public session.
D. Adoption in Other States
Starting in 1951, the concept of municipally financed industrial
construction expanded rapidly, and by 1965 industrial development
bonds had been authorized in twenty-three states.10 The enabling
legislation and, in some cases, constitutional amendments, have auth-
orized the use of either revenue bonds, general obligation bonds, or
various combinations of both. The revenue bonds have been by far
the most popular, both in the legislative enactments and in the bond
issues actually sold.
Revenue bonds were authorized in Tennessee in 1951, and general
obligation bonds in 1955. Both acts require the approval of three-
fourths of those voting at a special election called for this purpose,
and the general obligation bonds can be issued only after a certificate
of public purpose and necessity has been obtained from the Tennessee
Industrial and Agricultural Development Commission upon findings
corresponding to those set out in the Mississippi act. A separate 1955
act provided for the creation of local industrial development corpora-
tions similar to the 1949 Alabama act. Like the Alabama statute, this
act provides that the municipality shall not be liable for the debts
of its corporate satellite; but the Tennessee act goes on to provide
that the municipality may pledge its full faith and credit as surety for
the bonds. In the latter event, the requirements for a certificate of
public purpose and necessity and for voter approval are the same as
for the direct general obligation bonds. During the period the three
Tennessee acts have been in force, the revenue issues have exceeded
the general obligation issues by a margin of seven to one."
10. The statutory references and citations to the leading cases in the states where
industrial development bonds have been approved are set out in the appendix infra.
11. The Tennessee Taxpayer, July 1, 1962.
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In 1958, a self-executing constitutional amendment was adopted
in Arkansas which authorized municipalities to issue industrial de-
velopment bonds and to guarantee payment by a special tax levy not
to exceed five mills. A 1960 revenue bond act in the same state
empowered the issuing municipality to further secure the bonds by a
pledge of its surplus revenues from other projects and utilities.
Although having Southern origins and sometimes referred to as
the "second war between the states,"12 industrial development bonds
have been authorized in such non-Southern states as Illinois, Vermont,
North Dakota, and Nebraska.
E. Use of State Funds
Direct financial aid to industrial development has taken other
forms, particularly in the northeastern area. A 1958 Rhode Island
statute established a state-wide industrial building authority which
can pledge the full faith and credit of the State to guarantee payment
of first mortgages on industrial projects owned and leased by local
development corporations.13 This guarantee closely resembles the
mortgage insurance operation of the Federal Housing Administration.
'Similar legislation has been adopted in Maine,' 4 New Hampshire15
and Connecticut.'
6
An even more direct use of state funds for industrial development
is contained in the Pennsylvania Development Authority Act adopted
in 1956.17 This act created a state authority with an initial appropriated
capital of five million dollars for the purpose of making direct loans to
local industrial development agencies. Under the original terms
of the act, the authority could lend the local agency up to thirty per
cent of the cost of the project on the security of a second mortgage
when the following conditions were met: (1) the community is a
"critical economic area" under standards set forth in the statute; (2)
the community provides not less than twenty per cent of the cost of the
project; (3) an institutional investor provides the balance of the
financing under a first mortgage; and (4) a responsible tenant or
buyer is ready to take over the project. A significant 1961 amendment
enabled the state authority to purchase or make payments on the first
mortgage. This amendment also changed the required percentage
of local funds to ten per cent and raised the maximum loan from the
state authority to forty per cent.
12. Pfilcher, Industrial Aid Bonds: Low Cost Capital for Private Business, Mich.
Bus. Rev., Nov. 1961, p. 34.
13. R.I. GEN. LAWS AN,,. §§ 42-34-1 to -18 (Supp. 1964).
14. ME.-REvSTAT. ANN h.10, §§ 701-852 (1964).
15. N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 162-A:14-a to -c (1964).
16. CoNN. GF. STAT. LEv. §§ 32-10 to -22 (1961).
17. PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 73, §§ 301-14 (1960).
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The 1961 New York Job Development Authority Act18 created a
state authority similar in purpose and scope to the Pennsylvania plan
except that the initial capitalization was 100 million dollars to be
provided by the sale of the authority's bonds with half of the bonds
being unconditionally guaranteed by the State. This act also provided
for annual appropriations to support its purposes. The New Jersey
State Area Redevelopment Assistance Act, adopted in 1962,19 also
follows the general plan of the earlier Pennsylvania program but
requires that the project be located in an area declared eligible for
federal assistance and limits the amount of the state's second mort-
gage to 10 per cent of the cost of the project. The capitalization of
the New Jersey authority is in the form of a non-interest bearing,
thirty-year loan from the state escheat account.
II. CoNsTrI oNAL BACKGROUND
A. Federal
Like most innovating social legislation, the statues authorizing the
issuance of industrial development bonds have been tested on several
constitutional grounds. In Albritton v. City of Winona,20 the first
test case, the Mississippi statute was upheld by the Supreme Court
of Mississippi, and an appeal was taken to the Supreme Court of
the United States. This appeal was dismissed per curiam "for the want
of a substantial federal question." There have been no other modem
cases on this subject in the Supreme Court, and the effect to be given
the per curiam dismissal of the appeal in Albritton can only be judged
in the light of its historical background, particularly in view of three
earlier decisions that were very much to the contrary.
1. The Late Nineteenth Century Cases.-The Supreme Court's de-
cision in Citizens' Savings & Loan Ass'n. v. Topeka2' is probably the
forebear of all judicial precedents considering the use of municipal
bonds to aid local industry, and for many years it was the principal
authority on the constitutional question involved. Pursuant to enabling
acts of the Kansas legislature, Topeka had "donated" 100 thousand
dollars of its bonds to an iron works company in order to encourage
its establishment in the city. In an action brought after the bonds
had defaulted, it was conceded that they had been regularly issued
and that the plaintiff was a bona fide purchaser so that the sole
question was the authority of the Kansas legislature to pass the
18. N.Y. PUB. AuTH. LAw §§ 1800-34.
19. N.J. REV. STAT. §§ 13:1B-15.13 to -15.22 (Supp. 1964).
20. 181 Miss. 75, 178 So. 799, appeal dismissed per curiam, 303 U.S. 627 (1938);
Annot., 115 A.L.R. 1436 (1938).
21. 87 U.S. 655 (1875).
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enabling statute. The opinion recites that there were no existing funds
from which the bonds could be paid, and that necessarily they would
have to be paid, if at all, from tax revenues. It was held that a tax can
only be levied for a public purpose and that a contribution to the aid
of any manufacturer was not such a purpose. Hence, these bonds were
void.
In making its decision, the Court did not cite any specific consti-
tutional restrictions, either federal or state, but appears to hold that
the rule of levying taxes for a public purpose only is an inherent
limitation on government. Considering the merits of the specific
statute before it, the Court stated that if the door was open to the
aid of a manufacturing company it could be extended to merchants,
builders, bankers and others, and could "open the coffers of the
public treasury to the importunities of two-thirds of the business
men of the city or town."z2 A noteworthy dissenting opinion stated
that it was not competent for a federal court to adjudge a state statute
void unless it conflicted with some provision of the Constitution of the
United States or of the state.
In Parkersburg v. Brown,23 suit was brought against the city by the
holders of certain defaultedbonds to recover the principal and interest
due. The bonds had been issued under an act of the West Virginia
legislature which authorized the city to lend its bonds to manufacturers
locating in the city. This "loan" was evidenced by the manufacturer's
notes to the city and secured by a deed of trust on its property. The
manufacturer had become bankrupt and the city had failed to enforce
the deed of trust. The suit asked for a receiver to take charge of the
remaining property and for a deficiency judgment against the city.
Citing Topeka, the Court had little difficulty in holding that the
enabling legislation was invalid and the bonds void since they were
not issued for a public purpose. Again the Court seemed to base
its decision on an unwritten but inherent limitation on any legislature,
and further stated:
There was no provision in the Constitution of West Virginia of 1862
authorizing the levying of taxes to be used to aid private persons in conduct-
ing a private manufacturing business. This being so, the legislature has no
power to enact the act of 1868.24
The same question was before the Court two years later in a suit
against the City of La Grange, Missouri.25 The bonds then in question
22. Id. at 665.
23. 106 U.S. 487 (1883).
24. Id. at 501. The quoted material is contrary to the principle that a state constitu-
tion is a limitation on the plenary power of the state and not a grant of power. 16
Am. Jun. 2d Constitutional Law § 17 (1964) Annot., 46 A.L.R. 609 (1927).
25. Cole v. La Grange, 113 U.S. 1 (1885).
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had been issued pursuant to an act authorizing the city to "donate"
its bonds to railroad and manufacturing companies under specified
conditions. Citing the two earlier decisions, the Court stated:
The general grant of legislative power in the Constitution of a State does
not enable the legislature, in the exercise either of the right of eminent
domain or of the right of taxation, to take private property, without the
owner's consent, for any but a public object. Nor can the legislature
authorize counties, cities or towns to contract, for private objects, debts
which must be paid by taxes. It cannot, therefore, authorize them to issue
bonds to assist merchants or manufacturers, whether natural persons or
corporations, in their private business. These limits of the legislative power
are now too firmly established by judicial decisions to require extended
argument upon the subject 2 6
Unfortunately for the innocent holders involved in the Topeka,
Parkersburg and La Grange cases, these decisions were not rendered
prior to the sale of the bonds but several years later when suit was
brought for their payment. The recent decisions on this subject have
all been the result of some type of test case with expert bond counsel
usually employed for such purpose.
2. The Court's Changing Approach.-In a long series of subsequent
decisions, the Supreme Court appears to have gradually taken a
complete about-face in its approach to the validity of state legislation
which authorizes a departure from the historical concepts of govern-
mental functions. This was first indicated in Fallbrook Irrigation
District v. Bradley,27 an 1896 case testing the constitutionality of
a California act creating an irrigation district and providing for
special assessments on property located within its boundaries. In
upholding the act, the Court seemed to follow the theory of the
dissent in the Topeka case:
We should not be justified in holding the act to be in violation of the
state constitution in the face of clear and repeated decisions of the highest
court of the State to the contrary, under the pretext that we were deciding
principles of general constitutional law. If the act violate any provision,
expressed or properly implied, of the Federal Constitution, it is our duty to
so declare it; but if it does not, there is no justification for the Federal courts
to run counter to the decisions of the highest state courts upon questions
involving the construction of state statutes or constitutions, on any alleged
ground that such decisions are in conflict with sound principles of general
constitutional law.28
The Topeka case was actually distinguished on the ground that
"there had been no decision of the highest state court upon the
26. Id. at 6.
27. 164 U.S. 112 (1896).
28. Id. at 155.
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question of whether the act violated the constitution of Kansas .... "29
However, the strong language of the earlier opinion nowhere indi-
cates any such qualification of that decision.
In Jones v. Portland,30 the Court considered an act of the Maine
legislature authorizing any city to establish a municipal coal and
fuel yard where such necessities could be sold at cost. Portland had
voted to establish such a yard and to raise the necessary money by
taxation. This endeavor was approved and the Court added:
While the ultimate authority to determine the validity of legislation under
the Fourteenth Amendment is rested in this court, local conditions are of
such varying character that what is or is not a public use in a particular
State is manifestly a matter respecting which local authority, legislative and
judicial, has peculiar facilities for securing accurate information. In that
view the judgment of the highest court of the State upon what should be
deemed a public use in a particular State is entitled to the highest respect.3'
Three years later in Green v. Frazier,32 the Court upheld North
Dakota legislation which created a state industrial commission to
operate several business enterprises. Large bond issues had been
authorized to provide capital and the full faith and credit of the
state was pledged to their payment. Referring to its own role, the
Court stated that the broad taxing power of a state was unrestrained
by any federal authority prior to the adoption of the fourteenth
amendment; but that under the due process clause of this amend-
ment "it has come to be settled that the authority of the States to
tax does not include the right to impose taxes for merely private
purposes."3 After noting that the people, the legislature, and the
highest court of North Dakota had declared these acts to be for a
public purpose, the Court concluded: "With this united action of
people, legislature and court, we are not at liberty to interfere unless
it is clear, beyond reasonable controversy that rights secured by the
Federal Constitution have been violated.","
In 1923 the Court in Milheim v. Moffat Tunnel Improvement Dis-
trict,35 considered a Colorado act creating a tunnel improvement
district. The bonds sold to finance the cost of the tunnel were to be
paid in part by a special assessment on property within the district.
The plaintiffs, as affected land owners, challenged the proposed tax
29. Ibid.
30. 245 U.S. 217 (1917).
31. Id. at 221.
32. 253 U.S. 233 (1920).
33. Id. at 238. However, the 14th amendment was not mentioned in the Topeka,
Parkersburg and La Grange decisions. See also Madisonville Traction Co. v. St. Bernard
Mining Co., 196 U.S. 239, 257 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
34. Id. at 239-40.
35. 262 U.S. 710 (1923).
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levy under the due process clause. On the question of public purpose,
the Court stated:
The nature of a use, whether public or private, is ultimately a judicial
question. However, the determination of this, question is influenced by local
conditions; and this Court, while enforcing the Fourteenth Amendment,
should keep in view the diversity of such conditions and regard with great
respect the judgments of state courts upon what should be deemed public
uses in any State .... And like respect should be accorded to the declara-
tions of the legislative body of the State.
3 6
The next major step in the Court's gradually evolving approach
to the public purpose question is illustrated in Carmichael v. Southern
Coal & Coke Co.37 This landmark decision upheld the Alabama
State Unemployment Compensation Act, which in turn was based
on federal standards and, in effect, had been coerced by the tax
provisions of the 1935 Social Security Act. The Court clearly recog-
nized the fourteenth amendment requirement that the taxing power
of a state can only be exerted to effect a public purpose, but added:
The states, by their constitutions and laws, may set their own limits upon
their spending power . . .but the requirements of due process leave free
scope for the exercise of a wide legislative discretion in determining what
expenditures will serve the public interest.
The existence of local conditions which, because of their nature and extent,
are of concern to the public as a whole, the modes of advancing the public
interest by correcting them or avoiding their consequences, are peculiarly
within the knowledge of the legislature, and to it, and not to the courfs, is
committed the duty and responsibility of making choice of the possible
methods .... [W]hether the present expenditure serves a public purpose is
a practical question addressed to the law-making department, and it would
require a plain case of departure from every public purpose which could
reasonably be conceived to justify the intervention of a court.m
This case is of particular importance since the tax measure under
attack was concerned with the relief of the miseries of unemployment.
On the merits, the Court cited several surveys and census reports
showing the problems caused by unemployment in Alabama. The
following observations should be equally significant in the considera-
tion of any legislation designed to curb unemployment:
Apart from poverty, or a less extreme impairment of the savings which
afford the chief protection to the working class against old age and hazards
of illness, a matter of inestimable consequence to society as a whole, and
apart from the loss of purchasing power, the legislature could have concluded
that unemployment brings in its wake increase in vagrancy and crimes against
--property, reduction in-the number -of marriages, deterioration of--family -life,
36. Id. at 717.
37. 301 U.S. 495 (1937).
38. Id. at 514-15.
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decline in the birth rate, increase in illegitimate births, impairment of the
health of the unemployed and their families and malnutrition of their
children.
Expenditure of public funds under the present statute, for relief of unem-
ployment, will afford some protection to a substantial group of employees, and
we cannot say that it is not for a public purpose.
When public evils ensue from individual misfortune or needs, the legisla-
may strike at the evil at its source. [Footnotes omitted.]
39
3. The Present Scope of the Federal Inquiry.-Less than a year
after Carmichael, the Court in Albritton disposed of the constitutional
challenge to the Mississippi industrial bond act in a memorandum
opinion which cited Jones, Green, Milheim, and Carmichael without
further comment.40 The decisions from Topeka to Albritton illustrate
a gradual but ever widening change in the Court's approach to the
public purpose doctrine. The Topeka case was decided on the basis
of some general constitutional principle or inherent common law
limitation on state action. In Falibrook Irrigation District, the Court
limited its right of inquiry to the specific requirements of the federal
constitution and also mentioned the great weight to be accorded
the judgment of state courts. In Jones and Green, the Court spoke of
the united action of the state legislature and judiciary in settling
the public purpose issue, and in Carmichael, it flatly stated that the
state legislature should choose the means of attacking a public evil.
While the Topeka, Parkersburg and La Grange cases have never
been specifically overruled, there seems to be little authority left in
those decisions. It is true that the Court has continuously maintained
the basic principle that the power of a state, and specifically the
power to tax, can be used only for public purposes. However, it
seems well settled that a state legislature's determination of what
constitutes a public purpose, if upheld by the highest court of the
state, will not be set aside under the federal constitution except for
the most clear and convincing reasons. The final blow to the rationale
of the Topeka case probably came in Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, decided
in the same term as Albritton, where the Court firmly declared that
"there is no federal general common law."41
Possibly the most significant recent statement of the Supreme Court
on the public purpose doctrine appeared in Everson v. Board of
Education,42 which involved a New Jersey statute authorizing
publicly financed bus transportation of students to both public and
private schools. In addition to the first amendment question, it was
39. Id. at 516-18.
40. Supra note 20.
41. 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
42. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
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also charged that the statute violated the fourteenth amendment by
authorizing the expenditure of public funds for a private purpose.
Citing the Topeka case, the Court stated:
It is true that this Court has, in rare instances, struck down state statutes
on the ground that the purpose for which tax-raised funds were to be
expended was not a public one .... But the Court has also pointed out
that this far-reaching authority must be exercised with the most extreme
caution .... Otherwise, a state's power to legislate for the public welfare
might be seriously curtailed, a power which is a primary reason for the
existence of states. Changing local conditions create new local problems
which may lead a state's people and its local authorities to believe that laws
authorizing new types of public services are necessary to promote the general
well-being of the people.
Nor does it follow that a law has a private rather than a public purpose
because it provides that tax-raised funds will be paid to reimburse individuals
on account of money spent by them in a way which furthers a public pro-
gram . . . Subsidies and loans to individuals such as farmers and home-
owners, and to privately owned transportation systems, as well as many
other kinds of businesses, have been commonplace practices in our state
and national history.43
B. State Constitutions
The various state courts considering the validity of industrial de-
velopment bonds have had much more difficulty resolving the
problems presented under the state constitutions than in satisfying
the requirements of the fourteenth amendment. In addition to the
universally implied requirement that the taxing and borrowing powers
of a state are subject to the public purpose doctrine, almost every
state constitution specifically prohibits the use of the credit of the
state or any of its political subdivisions for the aid of any private
party.44 Typical of this latter limitation, the Alabama Constitution
provides:
The legislature shall not have power to authorize any county, city, town, or
other subdivision of this state to lend its credit, or to grant public money
or thing of value in aid of, or to any individual, association, or corporation
whatsoever, or to become a stpckholder in any such corporation, association,
or company, by issuing bonds or otherwise.45
1. The Theory Upholding the Bonds.-These dual hurdles were
first met in Mississippi where the use of general obligation bonds
43. Id. at 6-7.
44. Note, 108 U. PA. L. Bimv. 95 (1959).
45. ALA. CONST. art. 4, § 94. In many cases, these provisions were the direct result
of the financial disasters suffered by several communities in the 19th century as a
consequence of having used their borrowing power to give financial aid to railroad
companies. For an analysis in depth on this question, see Pinsky, State Constitutional
Limitations on Public Industrial Financing: An Historical and Economic Approach, 111
U. PA. L. R-v. 265 (1963).
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was upheld in a lengthy opinion.46 This court stressed the theory that
a constitution cannot remain static and must be interpreted in the light
of changing economic and social conditions. In satisfying the public
purpose requirement, the court reasoned as follows: (1) It is a
duty of government to provide for the needs of the poor and to
relieve unemployment; (2) no one can deny that the government has
authority to do this by the direct use of tax funds to furnish food
and shelter in kind or money to buy these necessities; (3) the state
can also accomplish this same purpose indirectly by providing em-
ployment and the opportunity to earn a livelihood; (4) can the
state and municipality not engage the assistance of private industry
to operate the municipally owned plant, i.e., can it not use private
industry as a means to a public end?
The Court of Appeals of Kentucky had little difficulty upholding
a specific arrangement under that state's revenue bond act as a valid
exercise of the city's proprietary powers.47 In describing the act as
an "ingenious plan of paying for the property," the court found that
no use of the municipality's money or taxing power was involved
and thus avoided the public purpose doctrine. The court recognized
the specific constitutional prohibition against the loan of the city's
credit to private persons or corporations, but declared that the mere
use of the city's name and its agreement to collect rents and perform
other services as trustee was not a loan of its credit.
In an advisory opinion, the Supreme Court of Alabama stated that
the constitutional limitation was directed at actual pecuniary expendi-
tures and that revenue bonds issued by a public corporation were not
public indebtedness.48
2. Rejection of the Bonds and Constitutional Amendments.-The
first contrary decision was reached in Florida where the court not only
found that a proposed revenue bond arrangement violated the specific
constitutional prohibition against the lending of credit but added
that any financing of private enterprise by the use of public funds
was entirely foreign to our constitutional system no matter how worth-
while the undertaking.49 As opposed to the decisions in Kentucky and
Alabama, this court did not place any significance on the fact that
revenue bonds would not involve any municipal liability or tax. On
the contrary, it stated that, once the bonds were sold, the proceeds
would be public funds and could not be expended in aid of any private
enterprise.50 There had been no enabling legislation nor any vote
46. Albritton v. Winona, supra note 20.
47. Faulconer v. City of Danville, 313 Ky. 468, 232 S.W.2d 80 (1950).
48. Opinion of the Justices, 254 Ala. 506, 49 So. 2d 175 (1950).
49. State v. Town of North Miami, 59 So. 2d 779 (Fla. 1952).
50. This reasoning was followed in Ohio where the court invalidated an industrial
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of the electorate on the Florida proposal. However, the court took
pains to avoid any implication that a specific legislative determination
of public purpose would have changed its decision, stating that:
There are certain limits beyond which the Legislature cannot go. It cannot
authorize a municipality to spend public money or lend or donate, directly
or indirectly, public property for a purpose which is not public. A legisla-
tive determination may be persuasive, but it is not conclusive.5
The Florida decision was followed in Nebraska52 and Idaho.53 The
Nebraska court felt that the decisions in three of its sister states
approving revenue bonds were based on "fundamental fallacies of
reasoning," and that the proposed arrangement "would constitute a
death blow to the private enterprise system and reduce the Constitu-
tion to a shambles in so far as its protection of private enterprise is
concemed."54 In Idaho, the act was held to violate the constitutional
proscription against any "liability" which the court felt was broader
in scope than "indebtedness." This court criticized the earlier decisions
upholding the bonds as apologies dictated by expediency.
On the other hand, the Supreme Court of Maryland, in approving
an issue of general obligation bonds, stated that the constitution does
not write the doctrine of laissez faire into the law and expressly re-
jected the reasoning of the Florida and Nebraska cases.55 The
Nebraska decision was overridden by a specific constitutional amend-
ment. Similar amendments have been adopted in four other states,
and the bonds upheld without amendment in at least twelve states.5 6
3. The Problem of Contrary Precedents.-The constitutional de-
velopment in Tennessee presents an interesting sequence. A private
act of 1925 authorized the City of Lebanon to issue its general obli-
gation bonds to finance the construction of a factory for lease to a
private manufacturer. This act was held to be unconstitutional under
the public purpose test.57 In 1949, a similar proposal without the
benefit of enabling legislation was held unconstitutional under the
authority of the earlier decision.58 In the latter case, the court men-
tioned the "plausible theory" followed in Mississippi-that the reduc-
tion of unemployment through such an arrangement was a public
mortgage program financed by state revenue bonds. See note 77 infra.
51. State v. Town of North Miami, supra note 49, at 785.
52. State ex tel. Beck v. City of York, 164 Neb. 223, 82 N.W.2d 269 (1957).
53. Village of Moyie Springs v. Aurora Mfg. Co., 82 Idaho 337, 353 P.2d 767 (1960).
54. State ex tel. Beck v. City of York, supra note 52, at 231, 82 N.W.2d at 274.
55. City of Frostburg v. Jenkins, 215 Md. 9, 136 A.2d 852 (1957). This case
contains an excellent summary of the several constitutional problems involved.
56. The amendments and decisions are set out in the appendix.
57. Ferrell v. Doak, 152 Tenn. 88, 275 S.W. 29 (1925).
58. Azbil v. Lexington Mfg. Co., 188 Tenn. 477, 221 S.W.2d 522 (1949).
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purpose, but stated that Tennessee was committed to the contrary
majority rule. Two years later, the same court upheld a revenue
bond act of general application, and had little difficulty distinguishing
its earlier decisions since no tax moneys were involved.5 9
Not satisfied with the revenue bond act, the Tennessee legislature
added a new chapter in 1955 authorizing the use of general obligation
bonds. The court was asked to pass on the validity of this act in
1958, and the resulting judicial gymnastics would be well read by
any student of the logical dilemma.60 In a three to two decision, the
act was upheld without overruling any prior precedent. The majority
opinion contains a recitation of facts taken from the city's answer to
the complaint which set out to show the loss of adult population, the
lower wage scales prevailing in the state, and the great financial loss
incurred in educating children who, upon coming of age, were
forced to migrate to other states where more job opportunities were
available and pay scales more attractive. After acknowledging the
traditional concept that any taxation in aid of private enterprise
would be unconstitutional under the public purpose doctrine, the
court distinguished its earlier decision on the following grounds: (1)
This was a public rather than a private act and therefore expressed
the public policy of the state.61  (2) Since the 'certificate of the
state board and the vote of the electorate are required, standards are
set out and checks placed upon the authorities in charge of making
the contracts. (3) There was no indication of any crisis in the 1925
factual situation. The third point was expanded as follows:
It is the difference between a mere incident and a virtual crisis. Thus be-
comes applicable the principle of constitutional law that a legislative enact-
ment may be held unconstitutional under one set of facts and constitutional
under another set of facts....P
In Albritton v. Winona, the Supreme Court of Mississippi dis-
59. Holly v. City of Elizabethton, 193 Tenn. 46, 241 S.W.2d 1001 (1951).
60. McConnell v. City of Lebanon, 203 Tenn. 498, 314 S.W.2d 12 (1958). Whether
by choice or accident, this case involved the same city whose private act had been
declared unconstitutional in 1925.
61. But see State v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 204 Tenn. 207, 319 S.W.2d 90
(1958), where, in applying a similar constitutional limitation on the use of state funds,
the same court said: "If the Legislature is without authority under the Constitution
to enact a law, the situation is the same as though there were no attempt enactment."
Id. at 212, 319 S.W.2d at 93.
62. McConnell v. City of Lebannon, supra note 60, at 514, 314 S.W.2d at 19. It
has been suggested that this opinion leaves open the necessity of a judicial determination
that a "local crisis" exists for each bond issue under the 1955 act. Note, 14 VAND. L.
REv. 621, 627 (1961). However, the court did not make any such determination in
the next case considering this act and indicated that the findings of the state board
would probably be controlling. Mayor and Aldermen of the City of Fayetteville v.
Wilson, 212 Tenn. 55, 367 S.W.2d 772 (1963).
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tinguished a contrary precedent in much the same manner.63
4. Local Constitutional Amendments.-In Georgia, industrial de-
velopment bonds have been issued under the authority of "local
constitutional amendments." The adoption of such amendments by
a referendum in only the county concerned was authorized by a
1952 general amendment to the constitution, and the procedure for
determining its applicability was further clarified by a 1956 amend-
ment.6 When the General Assembly of Georgia proposes a consti-
tutional amendment, the Governor, Attorney General and Secretary of
State are to determine whether it is of general or local application.
If it is not general, it is submitted to a vote only in the political sub-
division directly affected, and if ratified, it becomes a local consti-
tutional amendment. Under this procedure fourteen counties were
authorized to issue revenue bonds or revenue anticipation certificates
for industrial building purposes in 1960,65 and an even larger num-
ber of industrial building development authorities were created
in 1962.66
5. State Financed Plans.-The constitutional aspects of the other
forms of financial aid to industrial development have had a similar
history. Advisory opinions in Rhode Island 7 and New Hampshire68
have approved the FHA type guaranty acts in those states. Similar
legislation has been upheld in Maine69 and Connecticut,7 0 with the
supreme court of the latter state making ihe following observation:
"The legislature was aware that Connecticut, the most industrialized
state in the nation, faced competition in retaining its present industries
and attracting new industries."71
However, the Delaware court, in considering a comparable act72
severed as unconstitutional the provision which authorized the state
treasurer to pay any deficiencies in the guaranteed bonds.7 3 The
63. See Carothers v. Booneville, 169 Miss. 511, 153 So. 670 (1934).
64. GA. CONSr. art. XIII, § 1. See also Smith v. State, 217 Ga. 94, 121 S.E.2d
113 (1961).
65. GA. CODE ANA. § 2-6005 (Supp. 1963).
66. GA. CODE ANN. § 2-3505 (Supp. 1963).
67. Opinion to the Governor, 88 R.I. 202, 145 A.2d 87 (1958). The act was
approved in a 1958 referendum under R.I. CoNsT. art. XXXI, § 1.
68. Opinion of the Justices, 103 N.H. 258, 169 A.2d 634 (1961). More recently this
court approved proposed legislation that followed the early Alabama program of
industrial financing through revenue bonds issued by local development corporations
except that established criteria of economic need must be met and the lessee is required
to make tax equivalent payments. Opinion of the Justices, 209 A.2d 474 (N.H. 1965).
69. Martin v. Maine Savings Bank, 154 Me. 259, 147 A.2d 131 (1958). This pro-
gram was authorized by a 1957 constitutional amendment. ME. CONsT. art. IX, § 14-A.
70. Roan v. Connecticut Indus. Bldg. Comm., 150 Conn. 333, 189 A.2d 399 (1963).
71. Id. at 339, 189 A.2d at 402.
72. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 7001-09 (Supp. 1064).
73. Opinion of the Justices, 177 A.2d 205 (Del. 1962). After severing the state
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New York Job Development Authority Act, which followed the format
of the Pennsylvania plan, was preceded by a constitutional amend-
ment which specifically approved the lending of state funds to
finance industrial development7 4 and the New Jersey adaptation
was upheld without such an amendment.7  An Illinois act creating
a state industrial development authority was held unconstitutional as
involving a continuing appropriation. 6 The Illinois authority was
to obtain its principal financing through the sale of revenue bonds,
but was initially capitalized with 500 thousand dollars in a form of
revolving fund. In considering an analogous authorization of in-
dustrial financing with state revenue bonds, the Ohio court held that
the contemplated action would clearly violate the constitutional pro-
vision that the credit of the state may not be given or lent in aid of
any private party.17
6. Approval of Each Statute Required.-The constitutional argu-
ments in the state courts have almost all followed the same pattern,
and the difference between those decisions upholding the acts and
those declaring them invalid appears to be a matter of emphasis. The
question has beeni whether the public benefit is an incident of the
aid to the private enterprise, or whether the use of private enterprise
is merely an aid to the municipality in accomplishing the real purpose
of the bonds. This difference is one of degree and more of an
economical debate that has been, and presumably will continue to be,
a matter of some controversy. Although the greater number of courts
have upheld the bond issues, there is a clear conflict in the state
decisions and no statute could be safely implemented without the
approval of the highest court of the particular state.
III. LEGISLATION
While -there is a certain amount of uniformity in the enabling
legislation and constitutional amendments authorizing the use of
guaranty, the court upheld the remaining provisions of the act which provide for
industrial financing through bonds issued by local development corporations. In net
effect, this may leave a self-sufficient revenue type enactment. However, the act
specifically prohibits any sale of the property in the event of default and the obvious
original intent was to depend on the state guaranty as the primary attraction in
marketing the bonds. A 1963 amendment, which is still to be tested, provides that the
state may make good any deficiency if the general asembly appropriates the necessary
funds.
74. N.Y. CoNsT. art. VII, § 8.
75. Roe v. Kervick, 42 N.J. 191, 199 A.2d 834 (1964). This lengthy decision traces
the constitutional history and purpose of the several industrial aid programs. While
industrial development bonds, as such, were not before the court, the opinion strongly
supports those cases which have upheld their constitutionality.
76. Bowes v. Howlett, 24 IMI. 2d 545, 182 N.E.2d 191 (1962).
77. State ex rel. Saxbe v. Brand, 176 Ohio St. 44, 197 N.E.2d 328 (1964).
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industrial development bonds, several variations appear in the specific
requirements. These differences may have been dictated by a concern
for certain constitutional limitations or other applicable legislation
in the particular state, and possibly, the liberal or conservative
tendencies of the draftsmen. Some of the acts are relatively short,
while others are very detailed in setting both the terms of the bonds
and the circumstances under which they can be issued.
A. Principal Provisions*
1. Purpose and Policy.-The declared purpose of the legislation is
usually to balance the state's economy, to relieve unemployment, and
to encourage the development of industry within the state. The
permanent re-enactment of the Mississippi law and the Kentucky
statute include the relief of the problems attendant on the reconver-
sion from a wartime economy to peace time pursuits, while the Ten-
nessee revenue bond act will aid the rehabilitation of returning
veterans. Such obsolete clauses could have a negative value in any
present validation proceeding. The declaration of policy frequently
includes a statement that the act is to be liberally construed for the
purposes intended and, in the case of revenue bonds, a provision
that any project undertaken is to be self-liquidating without the
municipality incurring any liability whatsoever.
2. Definitions.-Most of the acts define such terms as "municipality,"
"governing body" and "industrial project." The latter definition is
particularly important in describing the type of facility that may be
constructed or acquired, and in stating whether or not personal
property, including machinery and equipment, may be included in the
financing 8
3. Powers of a Municipality.-The special powers include the right
to acquire or construct one or more industrial projects, to issue bonds
for this purpose and to secure their payment, and to lease or sell
the projects so acquired. The early Mississippi act permits the munici-
pality to actually operate the project, but almost all other acts
specifically prohibit such action.
* The principal provisions are described in this section, and the statutory references
are collected in the appendix to this paper.
78. The inclusion of machinery and equipment has also been approved by court
decision. See, e.g., Miller v. Police jury, 226 La. 8, 74 So. 2d 394 (1954); Holly v.
City of Elizabethton, 193 Tenn. 46, 241 S.W.2d 1001 (1951). In the Elizabethton
case, the court observed that "four walls, floors and roof cannot accurately be termed
an 'industrial building."' 193 Tenn. at 49, 241 S.W.2d at 1003. In North Dakota,
the reference to personal property was deleted by a 1961 amendment and returned
by a 1965 amendment. However, another section of the same act provides that the
city may only acquire real property. N.D. CFNT. Con. § 40-57-03(1) (Supp.
1965).
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4. Special Elections or Referendums.-Except in Maryland, the use
of general obligation bonds must be approved by the electorate. A
similar requirement appears in about half of the revenue acts, but
is omitted where local development corporations are used. The 1960
Mississippi revenue bond act uses the negative approach. Here the
municipality is required to publish the authorizing resolution for a
stated period and to hold a special election only if a written protest
is filed by twenty per cent of the qualified voters. A similar provision
in the Michigan statute requires a referendum only if a petition is
filed by five per cent of the registered electors.
Where an election is required, the necessary approval runs from
a majority to three-quarters of those voting. The first Mississippi
act required the favorable decision of two-thirds of those voting
and also that a majority of the qualified electors in the affected
territory shall have voted. In Missouri, general obligation bonds may
be issued in the smaller counties with two-thirds approval, while
revenue bonds may be issued in any municipality with the consent
of four-sevenths of the voters. The act normally specifies the form of
the required notices, the period of notice, the terms of the ballot, and
the method of certifying the result. The Tennessee statute contains
a saving clause providing that the entry of the results of the election
on the minutes of the governing body shall be conclusive evidence
in any proceeding to contest the validity of the election. A similar
provision appears in the Arkansas statute.
5. Terms of Bonds and Restrictions on Sale or Amount.-A com-
mon provision is that the bonds will be sold at such interest rate, for
such term, and on such other conditions as the municipality may
determine. In several states, the maximum interest rate and term
are specifically limited. The statute may also require a sinking fund
or specify the percentage of the total issue that must be retired each
year. In Louisiana, the bonds cannot be sold at less than par and
in several states a public sale is required. All the statutes authorizing
the use of general obligation bonds place some top limit for indebted-
ness of this type based on the total assessed property values in the
municipality. This varies from two-tenths of one per cent in Mary-
land to twenty per cent in Louisiana and in Mississippi. The
limitation is five per cent in North Dakota and ten per cent in
Missouri and Tennessee. In Arkansas, the tax levy for this purpose
is limited to a rate of five mills. An almost standard provision
declares that any bonds issued under the act shall be negotiable
instruments.
6. Security for the Bonds.-In every case, the rentals and other
income from the projects are pledged to the direct payment of
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principal and interest on the bonds or to a sinking fund established
for that purpose. Most revenue bond acts provide for a mortgage
or deed of trust in favor of the bondholders, but Kentucky, Maryland
and Missouri are exceptions. The general obligation act in Tennessee
deleted the mortgage authorization that was contained in the earlier
revenue bond act, and there is no provision for a mortgage in
Louisiana or Maryland. The Arkansas act provides that the munici-
pality may also pledge its surplus revenues from other industrial
facilities and from its utilities. The use of a receiver in the event of
default may also be specifically authorized.
7. Application of Bond Proceeds.-A fairly standard provision is
that the bond proceeds shall be used to finance all costs of the project
including architects' and engineers' fees, the purchase price of any
part of the project acquired by direct purchase, construction costs
including installation of machinery and equipment, all expenses in
connection with the issuance and sale of the bonds, and interest during
the construction period and for six months thereafter. The Kentucky
act authorizes the financing of interest for the first three years, while
the Arkansas act provides that a portion of the proceeds may be
placed in a reserve to provide for debt service until sufficient reve-
nues are available. This act also provides that the proceeds may be
used for the payment of "any other costs of whatever nature."
Several of the revenue bond acts provide that any unneeded portion
of the bond proceeds shall be applied to the payment of principal
and interest. 9
8. Lease and Rentals.-A standard requirement is that the munici-
pality must lease the project for rentals at least sufficient to cover
the required debt service on the bonds. One city's attempt to build
and hold an industrial plant in anticipation of finding a lessee has
been held invalid.80 The Mississippi and Alabama acts require the
governing body of the municipality to make specific findings on
certain enumerated costs and to provide for rentals sufficient to
meet them. The Iowa statute further requires that the rent be not
less than the average per square foot rental for like facilities within
the competitive commercial area.81
9. State Tax Exemptions.-The provisions on this subject contain
79. See, e.g, the revenue bond acts in Alabama, Iowa, Mississippi, Nebraska and
West Virginia cited in the Appendix, infra.
80. City of Corbin v. Johnson, 316 S.W.2d 217 (Ky. 1958).
81. This requirement could present administrative problems due to the unique layout
of many industrial plants and the primary intent of attracting a lessee with a favorable
lease. However, when this question was raised the court merely stated that the
governing body should be able to determine the proper rental with reasonable
certainty. Green v. City of Mt. Pleasant, 131 N.W.2d 5 (Iowa 1964).
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almost as many variances as the number of acts passed. The Mis-
sissippi revenue bond act provides that the bonds and the income
therefrom, the mortgage and lease agreement, the project, and the
revenues derived from any lease thereof shall be exempt from all
taxation in the state. The earlier act exempted the bonds from all
taxation except gift and inheritance taxes. In Tennessee, the bonds
are exempt from all state and local taxes except inheritance, transfer
and estate taxes, while the Arkansas act provides that the bonds are
exempt from income and inheritance taxes but not from the property
tax.
Most statutes declare that the project itself shall be exempt from
taxation as any other municipal enterprise. However, the Nebraska
constitutional amendment and the Wyoming act provide that the
property shall be taxed in the same manner as private property while
leased. This type provision raises the interesting question of whether
the city's tax lien would take precedence over the mortgage given as
security for the revenue bonds issued by the city. With consid-
erable foresight, the Michigan act provides that the taxes applicable
to an industrial project shall be a direct debt from the lessee to the
taxing unit and shall not become a lien against the property. The
Maine statute provides that the leasehold interest of the lessee is
taxable, while a 1965 amendment to the North Dakota act grants the
lessee a tax exemption for the first five years of its occupancy.
A recent act of general application in Georgia provides that local
industrial development authorities are "institutions of purely public
charity," that all their property and income are exempt from taxa-
tion, and that their bonds shall be exempt from all taxation within
the state.
10. Other Provisions.-Several acts provide for the establishment
of a special state board with supervisory powers, and set out the
criteria or standards under which it will issue a certificate approving
any municipal undertaking. Where local industrial development
corporations are authorized, the act will contain the special incorpora-
tion procedures required, the powers of the corporation, and the
procedures for dissolution and disposition of its property. The
Missomri act requires competitive bids on all construction contracts,
and Oklahoma has a similar provision.82 Under the constitutional
amendment adopted in Louisiana, any "existing similar and directly
82. Where the statute was silent, two courts held that competitive bids were not
required for industrial projects financed by revenue bonds even though another statute
of general application required open competitive bidding on all municipal construction
contracts. See Green v. City of Mt. Pleasant, supra note 81; Gregory v. City of Lewis-
port, 369 S.W.2d 133 (Ky. 1963).
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competing industry" situated in the municipality must give its written
consent before any bond election may be called.
An amendment to the North Dakota act authorized the use of
general obligation bonds where the net worth of the lessee is at least
five times the city's investment in the project. The only unusual feature
of this limitation is the complete absence of a similar requirement in
the other statutes. An equally unique, but nevertheless desirable
provision, is contained in the Arkansas eminent domain laws. In the
event of the condemnation of "all or substantially all" of an industrial
development project in the state, the award must be at least sufficient
to cover all expenses and the amount necessary to satisfy the out-
standing bonds with interest to the next call date and whatever pre-
payment premium may be applicable.
83
The West Virginia act authorizes the city to pay preliminary
expenses incident to the development of the project out of any
available surplus to be reimbursed from the proceeds of the bond
sale. A corresponding provision in a 1963 amendment to the Ala-
bama Industrial Development Board Act authorized the issuance of
sh6rt term notes for temporary borrowing in anticipation of the sale
of the long term revenue bonds.
IV. THm LEASE AND OTHER DOCUMENTS
A. In General
The legal documentation supporting an issue of industrial develop-
ment bonds will include: (1) a transcript of the proceedings of the
governing body of the municipality covering its meetings and resolu-
tions together with the election proceedings and certificate of the
state board, if required; (2) the indenture, which would normally
include the terms of each bond in the recital paragraphs; (3) the
lease; and (4) the opinion of bond counsel. Many of the provisions
in these instruments have become fairly standardized, but there are
several areas that warrant consideration by any interested investor.
The opinion of bond counsel is usually limited to a statement that
the bonds have been regularly issued and are valid and binding
special obligations, that the indenture is a first lien on the property
described therein, and that the bonds are exempt from federal income
tax under existing statutes and regulations. In referring to the munici-
pality's title to the property and the lien of the indenture, this opinion
will normally rely upon an opinion of the city attorney or another
local attorney engaged for such purpose. The use of title insurance
has not been widespread in this field. If mentioned at all, the only
83. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 35-918 (1962).
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expression concerning the lease will usually be a statement that it is
legally binding and effective in accordance with its terms. However,
the investor must consider that the lease and frequently the indenture
have been drafted to the lessee's specifications. The employment of
special counsel for the bondholders appears to have been limited to
only a few issues where especially large amounts were involved.
Unfortunately, a tendency has developed to consider the lease and
indenture as satisfactory when sufficient rentals have been pledged
to the payment of the bonds. In some cases, there has also been
a drift away from the primary purpose of the enabling legislation and,
quite possibly, the purpose of the tax exemption.
1. The City's Problem.-The difficult position of counsel for the
city in objecting to the terms desired by the lessee is illustrated in
a damage action brought against Springfield, Tennessee, where it was
alleged that the city had defaulted on a contract to purchase property
for a proposed industrial development.8" The city had entered
negotiations with the complainant and with Wilson Athletic Goods
Manufacturing Company whereby the city would purchase com-
plainant's property and lease it to Wilson after making certain
improvements thereon. The undertaking was to be financed by the
sale of revenue bonds. A contract of purchase and sale was made
between the city and complainant conditioned on the requisite
approval of the voters and the city's entering into a lease contract
with Wilson. The city and Wilson executed a contract to make a
lease with a copy of the proposed lease attached and conditioned
only on voter approval. The voter approval was almost unanimous,
but Wilson became dissatisfied with the proposed site. The city
then agreed with Wilson to abandon the original contracts and entered
into a new transaction for an alternate location. The opinion sug-
gests that the city chose not to sue Wilson for performance rather
than antagonize this prospective employer, and risk creation of
a climate in the community adverse to new industry. However, the
court held that the city could not avoid its own obligation by refusing
to enforce its contract with Wilson and awarded substantial damages
to the property owner.
B. Specific Provisions
1. Commencement Date.-In the usual transaction, the lease is
executed and the bonds sold well in advance of the construction
of the industrial building. However, the lease must provide for
rentals to commence on a certain date in order to meet the required




debt service regardless of whether or not the building has been
completed and delivered to the lessee. A common provision is that
the lease term shall begin on the completion date or on the fixed
date, whichever shall be earlier. The lessee should also be required
to complete the project at its own expense if for any reason the bond
proceeds are insufficient.
2. Rentals.-It has become fairly standard to provide for semi-
annual rents payable immediately prior to the due date of the
bond payments. The lease may require fixed rentals, but it has
become more common to use a formula provision whereby each
rental payment will be an amount equal to the next maturing install-
ments of principal and interest on the bonds. Since the bonds are
normally sold in series with annual maturities, there would be a
correspondingly high and low rent payment in each year. The
lease should also provide for the tenant to pay, as additional rents,
all trustee's fees and any similar expenses that may be incurred.
While unusual when compared with the more conventional methods
of specifying rental payments, the formula method should not be
objectionable in and of itself. However, it has been combined with
an increasing number of credit provisions which could seriously
dilute the security value of the property. These credits can arise
from excess bond proceeds, hazard insurance proceeds, condemnation
awards, or even from the lessee's exercise of a purchase option, and
will be discussed under those topics.
3. Net Lease.-The lease must provide that the rents shall be
absolutely net to the lessor, and that the obligation of the lessee
to make the rental payments and perform its other agreements under
the lease shall be absolute and unconditional so long as any part of
the bond indebtedness is outstanding and unpaid. The following
provision has been used:
Until such time as the principal and interest on the bonds shall have been
fully paid or provision for the payment thereof shall have been made in
accordance with the indenture, the lessee will not suspend or discontinue
any payment provided for in this lease and will not fail to perform and
observe any of its other agreements and covenants as, contained herein
and will not terminate this lease for any cause, including, without limiting
the generality of the foregoing, failure of the lessor to complete the project,
any acts or circumstances that may constitute an eviction or constructive
eviction, failure of consideration or commercial frustration, any damage to or
destruction of the leased premises, the taking of the leased premises or any
portion thereof by eminent domain or otherwise, any change in the tax
or other laws of the United States or of any state or other governmental
authority, or any failure of the lessor to perform and observe any agreement
or covenant, whether express or implied, or any duty, liability or obligation
arising out of or connected with this lease.
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4. Disbursement of Bond Proceeds.-The indenture will normally
provide that the sum necessary to meet interim interest requirements
shall be allocated to a "bond fund" and that the remainder of the
proceeds shall be placed in a "construction fund," both funds being
held by the trustee. At this point, however, there is a marked de-
parture from normal methods of financing. Rarely, if ever, are ap-
proved, final plans and specifications attached to any document,
but rather the lessee is given the right to prepare the plans and
specifications after the bonds have been sold and to make such
changes and amendments as it may desire. One lessee did agree to
design a plant of a stated minimum productive capacity, but only
after the insistence of special counsel for the bondholders.
a5
It is commonly provided that the trustee will make disbursements
from the construction fund to reimburse the lessee for costs incurred
in constructing and equiping the project upon the certificate of one
of its designated officers. A more desirable provision is that the
trustee will make disbursements upon the joint certificate of a repre-
sentative of the city and of the lessee. Although seldom mentioned,
it would seem entirely in order to require the further certificate
of the supervising architect.
Since the bonds are normally marketed on the basis of the lessee's
financial strength and general reputation, the absence of an agree-
ment to build a specific structure may be accepted as a business
necessity. However, a common indenture provision is that any
excess moneys in the construction fund will, at the option of the
lessee, be used to retire outstanding bonds or paid into the bond
fund. Under the formula clause, any moneys in the bond fund
can be a credit on future rentals. Combined with the absence of
definite plans and specifications, this option, in effect, gives the
lessee the right to finance so much of its future rentals as it may
desire. A more proper provision would be that any excess moneys
in the construction fund should be held in a special fund to retire
bonds of the latest maturities by lot at the first call date.86 This would
also operate to give the lessee a credit on rentals, but only at the
end of the lease term when all bonds have been retired rather than
at the beginning of the term.
5. Fire, Casualty and Condemnation.-Every lease must neces-
85. An amendment to the North Dakota act authorizes the city to give the lessee sole
control of the acquisition, construction and installation of the industrial building. N.D.
C NT. 'CoDE; § 40-57-03(11) (Supp. 1965). Apparently the legislature could foresee
no difficulty in completely abrogating any governmental responsibility for the physical
facility.
86. The net result of using the excess bond proceeds as a credit on the first maturing




sarily provide that there will be no abatement or reduction of rent
in the event of property damage, and that the premises will be
promptly repaired or restored by the lessee. If the insurance pro-
ceeds or condemnation award should be insufficient, the funds neces-
sary to complete restoration must be provided by the lessee. Where
there is a major condemnation that would render the remaining
portion of the premiss unsuitable for the lessee's purposes, the
lessee usually has the option to purchase the property and terminate
the lease upon payment of an amount sufficient to retire all out-
standing bonds and, possibly, an additional sum (usually nominal)
that will be paid to the city after the bonds have been retired. A
similar option is frequently provided in the case of major damage
or destruction. In either event, the proceeds of any hazard insurance
or the condemnation award would be credited on the purchase price.
In some cases, the definition of the purchase price will include what-
ever call premium may then be applicable under the bonds; but in
others, the bonds may be callable without premium in such event.
Where the premises are to be restored, the lease should provide
for the funds to be held by the trustee and disbursed upon appro-
priate certificates as the work progresses. A frequent provision is
that insurance proceeds below a stated amount, e.g., 25,000 dollars may
be paid directly to the lessee. Another common provision is that any
excess portion of the insurance proceeds or condemnation award
will be paid into the bond fund. Since the lessee normally has the
privilege of revising the plans and specifications during restoration,
this raises the same problem as the excess moneys in the construction
fund. Some leases have even provided that any such excess will be
paid directly to the lessee. As already suggested, a more proper pro-
vision would direct that any unused insurance proceeds or condemna-
tion award be used to retire bonds of the later maturities.
6. Insurance.-A fairly standard clause requires the lessee to furnish
hazard coverage for the amount necessary to satisfy all outstanding
bonds or the full insurable value of the premises, whichever is less.
One proposed lease added the further qualification of "the amount
obtainable." Since there is normally no question of being able to
obtain coverage to full insurable value, this qualification could indi-
cate a particularly hazardous operation. In addition to tae-e-dp6sure
of the property, a substantial loss in such circumstances could
seriously affect the financial position of the lessee and this provision
should not be accepted.
Considering the primary purpose of the bond issue, a preferred
insurance requirement would be full replacement cost. "-It is also
suggested that the lease provide for war damage insurance where
1965]
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obtainable. The insurance clause should require the lessee to provide
general liability insurance in acceptable limits and workmen's compen-
sation coverage.
7. Temporary Investments.-The lease and indenture will often
provide that moneys held by the trustee may be temporarily invested
at the lessee's request with the earnings being credited on the
rental obligations. Such investments should be limited to short term
obligations of the United States or equally liquid securities, and the
lessee should be required to make up any loss incurred.
8. Use of the Premises-Assignment and Subletting.-In addition
to the right to use the premises for any lawful purpose, the lessee may
have the privilege of assigning the lease or subletting the premises
without obtaining the consent of the lessor. Considering the purpose
of the enabling legislation, at least a qualified restriction similar to
the following should be appropriate:
Insofar as practicable during the term of this lease, the premises shall be
used primarily for manufacturing operations and related functions including
administrative, sales and transportation functions, and shall not be used solely
for warehousing, it being the purpose of this lease to provide employment
for a substantial number of persons.
For like reason, it would seem proper to limit the rights of assign-
ment and subletting to a tenant against whom the lessor has no
reasonable objection.87 In a case arising in Mississippi, suit was
brought by the county for cancellation of the lease where the lessee
had ceased manufacturing operations and was using the premises as
a warehouse.P The court did not allow cancellation, but held that
the lessor could obtain an injunction restraining any use of the
premises other than as a factory. A dissenting opinion would have
allowed cancellation on the theory that the lessee had breached the
spirit of the lease and of the enabling legislation.
9. Expansion Rights.-The parties to the lease will normally want
to provide some method of expanding the project if business conditions
should so warrant. This has been done either through a provision
authorizing the issuance of parity bonds or by allowing certain land
87. Such limitations on the use of the premises were strongly suggested in a con-
curring opinion in Albritton v. Winona, 181 Miss. 75, 113, 178 So. 799, 810 (1938).
Contra, State ex rel. County Court v. Bane, 135 S.E.2d 349 (W. Va. 1964), where
the court approved the financing of a warehouse in an opinion that did not discuss
the "public purpose" requirement. The Rhode Island court was asked whether a
luxury motel could be an industrial project under that state's guaranty type act.
Appropriately, it held that it could not. Opinion to the Governor, 90 R.I. 135, 155
A.2d 602 (1959).
88. Greenfield v. Perry County, 205 F.2d 323 (5th Cir. 1953).
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to be removed from the lien of the indenture and used as the basis
for a separate bond issue. Where provision is made for parity bonds,
the investor should be satisfied as to both the amount that may be
issued and the purpose for which they may be used. It has been
suggested that placing a limit on the amount of parity bonds would
be unavailing since the primary security is the financial stability of
the tenant who could always lease an entirely separate project. How-
ever, this overlooks the fact that the investor is also interested in the
security value of the site and the quantum of improvements that can
be sustained at the particular location. Even where a mortgage is
not used and only the rentals pledged, it may be easier to find a
new tenant for a smaller facility if the original lessee should not
remain in possession.
Several leases provide that the lessee may obtain the release of
unimproved land from both the lease and the indenture where the
released land will be separately leased from the city and additional
improvements constructed thereon. In some' cases, the only require-
ment has been the certificate of an independent engineer that the
released land is not needed for the operation of the project and that
the usefulness of the remaining land will not be impaired. A few
indentures have contained the additional requirement that the fair
market value of the released property, as certified by an independent
appraiser, must be paid to the trustee. In any event, the lessee's
expansion option should be conditioned on the attainment of a speci-
fied payroll or some other appropriate limitation.
10. Purchase and Renewal Options.-At the end of the original
term and after all bonds have been retired, the lessee usually has
several renewal options at a nominal rent or an option to purchase
the project for a relatively minor sum. While the use of only renewal
options would allow the city to eventually obtain the property without
investment on its part, the city's purposes may be better served by
granting only a purchase option. This would have the effect of re-
turning the property to the tax rolls if exercised. These options
could raise additional problems under certain constitutional and
statutory provisions. Viewing the plan as a whole, however, the
courts considering the question have upheld such options as an
appropriate part of the entire transaction between lessor and lessee.89
89. See, e.g., Newberry v. City of Andalusia, 257 Ala. 49, 57 So. 2d 629 (1952)
(renewal option); Bennett v. City of Mayfield, 323 S.W.2d 573 (Ky. 1959); State ex
-rel. Meyer v. Lancaster, 173 Neb. 195, 113 N.W.2d 63 (1962); Darnell v. County of
Montgomery, 202 Tenn. 560, 308 S.W.2d 373 (1957). But see State ex rel. City of
El Dorado Springs v. Holman, 363 S.W.2d 552 (Mo. 1962), where a possible drafting




The lessee may also have an option to purchase the property prior
to the retirement of the bonds in the event of major loss by condem-
nation- or other casualty. A similar option may be provided in the
event of commercial frustration, e.g., removal of a protective tariff.
The principal concern here is that the purchase price must include
whatever amount is necessary to redeem all outstanding bonds with
accrued interest and- prepayment premium if applicable.
11. Financial Statements.-A standard lease provision requires the
lessee to furnish audited financial statements covering its operations
to the trustee at least annually. The instruments should provide that
copies of such statements will be made available to any bondholder
on request.
12. Property Taxes or Equivalent Payments.-Even though most
statutes specifically provide that the property is exempt from state and
local taxation as municipally owned property, the lease should require
the lessee to pay whatever taxes may become payable. It is possible
that the law may be changed during the term of the lease or the
tax exemption removed by judicial decision. Depending on the
relative bargaining position of the city and the inducements held
out, the lease may provide for the lessee to make tax equivalent
payments to cover whatever municipal services may be provided.0
13. Financial Restrictions.-Several of the earlier leases included
specific restrictions on further financing or cash outlays by the lessee.
However, such provisions have all but disappeared in the more
recent issues. Considering the nature of the primary security, limita-
tions on additional debt, lease commitments and dividend payments
may be appropriate in some cases.
14. Amendment of the Lease and Indenture.-The lease should
provide that it cannot be amended without the trustee's consent.
Under the indenture, the trustee is usually authorized to consent
to technical changes in any of the instruments and to make other
changes not affecting the essential financial features of the bonds
with the consent of the holders of two-thirds of the outstanding
bonds. It is frequently provided that no change may be made in the
indenture without the consent of the lessee. This requirement should
be limited to matters-affecting the lessee's interest_.
90. The .Iowa act requires that tax equivalents be paid from the revenues of the
project and advisory opinions in New Hampshire held that a proposed act would be
unconstitutional if such payments were not a mandatory requirement., Iowa Cons
SA . § 419.11 _(Supp. 1964); Opinion of the Justices, 207 .A,2d 574 (Nn. ,965);
Opinion of the Justices, 209"A.2d 474 (N.H. 1965).
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V. FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION
In most cases, the key to the successful financing of industrial
development projects is provided by the several federal income tax
advantages afforded. These involve not only the exempt status
accorded municipal securities, but also the deduction taken by the
lessee for its payments under the lease and the fact that the lessor is
not a taxpaying entity.
A. Exempt Status of the Bonds
With rare simplicity, the Internal Revenue Code merely provides
that gross income does not include interest on the obligations of a
state or any of its political subdivisionsf' However, it seems well
settled, under both court decisions and existing rulings of the Service,
that revenue bonds and bonds issued by a municipally owned corpora-
tion or authority are "obligations" for the purposes of this section.
92
In 1954, the Revenue Service ruled that bonds issued by or in behalf
of a municipality to finance the acquisition of an industrial plant
for lease to private enterprise constitute obligations of a political
subdivision within the meaning of the Code.93 This ruling held that
the interest was exempt notwithstanding the purpose for which the
bonds were issued or that the promise to pay was limited to the
revenues from the project. Specifically referring to the Alabama
Industrial Development Act, a 1957 ruling stated that bonds issued
by an industrial development board created under that act would be
considered as issued on behalf of a political subdivision of the state
and the interest thereon exempt from the federal tax. 4
A related 1959 ruling held that bonds issued by a non-profit cor-
poration formed under the general laws of a state to finance the
acquisition of a waterworks system would be exempt where no part
of the earnings could accrue to any private individual and the title
to the corporation's property must vest in the municipality when the
indebtedness was retired.95 The ruling noted that the city had ap-
proved all contracts including the revenue bonds, that the city would
automatically obtain title when the indebtedness was paid in full,
that the city council had control of the corporation, and that any
surplus receipts were to be paid into the city's general fund. A
91. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 103.
92. Commissioner v. Shamberg's Estate, 144 F.2d 998 (2d Cir. 1944), cert. denied,
323 U.S. 792 (1945); Commissioner v. White's Estate, 144 F.2d 1019 (2d Cir. 1944),
cert. denied, 323 U.S. 792 (1945); Bryant v. Commissioner, 111 F.2d 9 (9th Cir. 1940).
Rulings on many authority obligations and revenue issues are collected in 2 P-H FED.
TAx Smv. 11[ 8240, 8244 (1965).
93. Rev. Rul. 54-106, 1954-1 Cum. BULL. 28.
94. Rev. Rul. 57-187, 1957-1 Cmr. BuLL. 65.
95. Rev. Rul. 59-41, 1959-1 Cum. BuLl.. 13.
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similar ruling had been issued in 1954 in the case of debentures
issued by a non-profit corporation formed under the general corpora-
tion laws of the state for the purpose of providing a community
civic and recreational facility.
96
The use of local development corporations may have been somewhat
limited by a recent ruling which appears to depart from the basic
viewpoint of its predecessors. 97 Setting forth five specific require-
ments for exemption, this ruling held that bonds issued by a non-
profit corporation formed under the general corporation laws of a
state for the purpose of financing the acquisition, lease and sale of
industrial facilities would not be considered as having been issued
"on behalf of" a political subdivision within the meaning of the Code
where: (1) the municipality did not have a beneficial interest in
the corporation while its bonds were outstanding; (2) although the
articles of incorporation provided that the corporate property would
be transferred to the county upon retirement of the bonds or dissolu-
tion of the corporation, there would not necessarily be a vesting
of full legal title in the county since the corporation may never be
dissolved or the bonds retired; and (3) neither the state nor any
political subdivision had approved the specific bonds issued by the
corporation even though they may have authorized the creation of the
corporation and approved its general objectives. The prior rulings
were distinguished on various grounds noting, among other things,
that the Alabama act provided special incorporation procedures. 8
However, most of the distinctions mentioned appear to be matters of
form rather than substance. This recent pronouncement could indicate
a tightening-up attitude by the Service or, possibly, it may have been
the result of a bad factual situation.
Critics of the general exemption for municipal securities have been
particularly emphatic in the case of industrial development bonds,
pointing out that the state's advantage of a lower interest cost is
being passed on to private enterprise. 99 There can be little argument
with this latter proposition. However, in this day of even less subtle
use of the tax laws to spur industrial development and the general
economy, it seems unlikely that the exemption for these bonds will
be removed without a complete overhaul of the entire structure of
96. Rev. Rul. 54-296, 1954-2 Cum. BULL. 59.
97. Rev. Rul. 63-20, 1963-1 Cum. BULL. 24.
98. The partially invalidated Delaware act provided for creation of the local de-
velopment corporations under the general laws relating to non-profit corporations. See
notes 72 & 73 supra.
99. Ratchford, Revenue Bonds and Tax Immunity, 7 NAT'L TAx J. 40 (1954).
See also Gelfand, Tax Exempt Securities and The Doctrine of Reciprocal Immunity,
32 Tm,. L.Q. 173 (1959); Ratchford, Intergovernmental Tax Immunities in the
United States, 6 NA'L TAx J. 305 (1953).
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inter-governmental tax exemptions. 10
In 1953, a bill was introduced by Congressman Multer of New
York which would have denied exemption in the case of obligations
issued in connection with the development of property to be operated
by a non-public enterprise and not secured by the general credit
of the issuer.101 This bill was not reported out of committee. A
different approach was used by the drafters of the 1954 Code. The
House bill would have denied a deduction to the lessee for rental
payments made to municipalities where the property was acquired
by revenue bonds and leased to private enterprise. However, this
limitation was rejected by the Senate and finally deleted in the
conference committee, where it was pointed out that, as written, it
would adversely affect airports and similar facilities in addition to
industrial plants.10 2 In 1961, Senator McNamara of Michigan intro-
duced a bill similar to Congressman Multer's except that it was not
limited to revenue bonds.1°3 This bill also died in committee. In
1963, Congressman Multer put his earlier bill back into the legislative
bopper,0 4 but it was not picked up in the administration's general
tax bill. Both Congressman Multer's and Senator McNamara's bills
would have applied only to obligations issued after their enactment.
B. The Lessee's Rental Payments
In view of the liberal purchase and renewal options generally
granted to the lessee of a municipally developed industrial building,
the lessee's rent deduction would appear to be the weakest link in
the chain of desirable income tax attributes. The Internal Revenue
Code provides for deducting, as a business expense:
[R]entals or other payments required to be made as a condition to the con-
tinued use or possession, for purposes of the trade or business, of property
to which the taxpayer has not taken or is not taking title or in which he has
no equity.'05
In the only reported case on this specific question, however, the
decision has been for the taxpayer. In Gem, Inc. v. United States,1°6
the taxpayer had leased a plant developed under Mississippi's act.
100. For a full discussion of the arguments on both sides of the basic constitutional
question, see 1 COMPENDImM OF PAPERS ON BROADENING Tm TAX BASE SUBMIrTE TO
THE HousE COMM1TrEE ON WAYS AND MEANS 679-791 (1959).
101. H.R. 2734, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. (1953).
102. H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 33 (1954); S. REP. No. 1622 83d
Cong., 2d Sess. 40 (1954); H.R. REP. No. 2543, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 33 (1954);
1954 U.S. CODE CoNG. & AD. NEws 4058, 4671-72, 5293.
103. S. 2042, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961).
104. H.R. 517, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963).
105. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 162(a) (3). (Emphasis added.)
106. 192 F. Supp. 841 (N.D. Miss. 1961).
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The lease provided for rentals sufficient to completely amortize the
bonds over its original twenty-year term, and also provided for three
twenty-year renewal options and one nineteen-year renewal option
at an apparently nominal rental. The government's position was
that the sharply reduced rental payments during the renewal terms,
coupled with the fact that the property would also be exempt from
local taxes, indicated that the alleged rental payments during the
original term were really payments for the acquistion of an equity
and should be amortized over the life of the property. The court,
however, felt that the question was governed by the regulation dealing
with the write-off of a lessee's improvements, where it is provided:
As a general rule, unless the lease has been renewed or the facts show with
reasonable certainty that the lease will be renewed, the cost or other basis
of the lease, or the cost of improvements shall be spread only over the
number of years the lease has to run without taking into account any right
of renewal.107
On facts that must have been very ably presented on behalf of
the taxpayer, ,the court found that there was no reasonable certainty
that the lease would be renewed in view of the highly competitive
nature of the lessee's business and the potential burdens of the lessee
under other provisions of the lease, i.e., to continue a manufacturing
operation, to make repairs and maintain the premises, and to provide
satisfactory insurance.'08
The presence of a purchase option at an annually reducing price
did not prevent the taxpayer from obtaining a rental deduction in
Breece Veneer & Panel Co. v. Commissioner,10 9 where the property
had been leased and eventually purchased from the Reconstruction
Finance Corporation. The opinion emphasized the fact that the
agreement had been made in an arm's length bargain. On the other
hand, where the option price was extremely low when related to
total rents and the transaction between related parties, an alleged lease
of land and buildings was held to be a sales contract.110
The basic position of the Internal Revenue Service on this subject
has been outlined in a 1955 ruling, which holds that the transaction
will be classified as a purchase and sale if, the total "rentals" plus
the option price, if any, are approximately equal to the regular
purchase price plus interest."' In general, the Commissioner's efforts
107. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-11(b) (2) (1963).
108. Compare f111 (3), (6), (8) & (12) of section IV. B supra.
109. 232 F.2d 319 (7th Cir. 1956).
110. Frito-Lay, Inc. v. United States, 209 F. Supp. 886 (N.D. Ga. 1962).
ill. Rev. Rul. 55-540, 1955-2, Cum. BULL. 39. For related rulings finding that the
transaction was a sale, see Rev. Rul. 55-541, 55-542, 1955-2 CuM. BULL. 19, 59; Rev.
Rul. 57-371, 1957-2, Cum. BULL. 214.
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on this question have met with at best mixed success." 2 Sometimes
little more than a moral victory has been achieved. While, holding
for the government in an equipment rental case, the Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit concluded its opinion with the following observa-
tion:
We do not criticize the commissioner. It is his duty to collect the revenue
and it is a tough one. If he resolves all questions in favor of the taxpayers,
we soon would have little revenue. However, we do suggest that after he
has made allowance for depreciation, which he concedes, and an allowance
for interest, the attack on many of the 'leases' may not be worthwhile in
terms of revenue. 113
C. Tax Exempt Status of the Municipality
One writer has suggested that the use of industrial development
bonds would be seriously hampered if the municipality itself was
required to pay federal income taxes." 4 It is possible that after
deducting interest and depreciation from the rentals received, the
municipality may derive some net income from the project. However,
this would seem very difficult to measure where there are purchase
or renewal options at nominal rates. As important as this question may
be, and particularly in view of the great weight accorded the subject
in a long series of Supreme Court decisions involving other taxes,"5
there is surprisingly little authority or precedent available. The Code
provides that gross income does not include:
[I]ncome derived from any public utility or the exercise of any essential
governmental function and accruing to a State or Territory, or any political
subdivision thereof, or the District of Columbia.
116
There are no Treasury regulations on the subject, and it only
appears to have been directly considered in two General Counsel
memorandums published in 1934 and 1935. Both memorandums
concerned a state's liability for income tax on the operation of con-
trolled liquor stores, and both reached the conclusion that the income
was not taxable although for entirely different reasons. While recog-
nizing that this particular operation was a proprietary rather than
a governmental function, the earlier memorandum held that it was
112. See, e.g., Western Contracting Corp. v. Commissioner, 271 F.2d 694 (8th Cir.
1959) (for taxpayer); Arkansas Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 224 F. Supp. 171
(W.D. Ark. 1963) (for taxpayer-collects cases); Friedman, Lease or Purchase of
Equipment: Sale and Leaseback, 14x N.Y.U. INsT. oss FFD. TAX. 1427 (1956).
113. Starr's Estate v. Commissioner, 274 F.2d 294, 296-97 (9th Cir. 1959).
114. Armstrong, "Municipal Inducements"-The New Mexico, Commercial and In-
dustrial Project Revenue Bond A6t, 48 CALIF. L. Rr . 58 (1960). "' .. '
115. New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572 (1946); Ohio v. Helvering, 292 U.S.
360 (1934); South Carolina v. United States, 199 U.S. 437 (1905).
116. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 115(a)(1).
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still nontaxable on finding that the profits would be used for the
relief of the indigent-an essential governmental function.
1 1 7
The next question in logical sequence was presented the following
year where the facts showed that the profits would be placed in the
state's general fund and not earmarked for any particular purpose.118
In a rather remarkable bit of statutory construction, this memorandum
concluded that the Code provision related only to passive income and
not to income from a direct state operation. Having thus mitigated
the theory of its predecessor, this memorandum went on to say that
a state is neither an individual nor a corporation, as such taxpaying
entities are defined in the Code, and also placed considerable weight
on the fact that the Internal Revenue Service had never made any
effort to obtain income tax returns from a state even though the
law had then been in effect for some twenty-two years. Quaere,
where would this reasoning leave the tax status of activities that
are direct operations of municipalities and other corporate political
subdivisions?
D. A Pidce de Resistance
There is one recent case upholding a proposed issue which merits
consideration in any discussion of the federal tax features of industrial
development bonds. By virtue of special enabling legislation,119
Covington, Kentucky proposed to issue revenue bonds for the purpose
of financing the acquisition of a large industrial tract which was to
be leased to a substantial employer at a rental of one dollar per
year. A bond issue in the amount of 2.5 million dollars was approved
to cover the cost of the site. The improvements, which eventually
would become the property of the city, were to be constructed by
the lessee at its own expense.
Since no rents were available for the payment of the bonds, they
were secured by a pledge of the surplus revenues from the city's
water and sewer systems, and, additionally, by a special allocation
of the city wage tax collected from the employees of this new
enterprise. The substantial employer in this case, who would in
effect acquire the use of this costly site, rent free, by the device of
passing a part of the cost on to a tax on its own employees, was
none other than the Internal Revenue Service.
120
117. G.C.M. 13745, XIII-2, CuM. BUiL. 76 (1934).
118. G.C.M. 14407, XIV-1, Ctr. BULL. 103 (1935).
119. Ky. Acts 1962, ch. 178; Ky. RFv. STAT. §§ 82.105-.180 (1963).
120. Grimm v. Moloney, 358 S.W.2d 496 (Ky. 1962). The site will be occupied by a
data processing center. Subsequent to the court's decision, the city revised its offer




A. The Federal Bankruptcy Act
While claims for anticipatory breach of contract including unexpired
leases are provable in bankruptcy, a landlord's claim for damages
resulting from the rejection of an unexpired lease or for indemnity
under a specific covenant is limited to an- amount not exceeding the
rent reserved for the year next succeeding the date of surrender or
the date of re-entry, whichever first occurs, plus the unpaid rent
accrued to such date.' 21 In the case of a reorganization proceeding
under Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act or an arrangement under
Chapter XI, the limitation is the amount of rent reserved for the
next three years.'22 In any case, however, the lessor cannot auto-
matically file claim for the statutory maximum but rather must prove
the actual loss sustained. The measure of damages would normally
be the difference between the rental value of the remainder of the
term and the rent reserved, both discounted to present worth.'3
Another section of the act provides that the trustee must assume
or reject an unexpired lease within sixty days after the adjudication
or within thirty days after the qualification of the trustee, whichever
is later. 24 However, the court may extend or reduce the time for
cause shown. The same section also provides that an express covenant
terminating the lease or giving either party an election to terminate
in the event of bankruptcy or of an assignment by operation of law
will be enforceable. Under these limitations of the Bankruptcy Act,
the holder of industrial development bonds would not be in the
same position as the holder of the lessee's direct obligations; but
rather would be limited to a prorata share of whatever amount may
be recovered by the lessor in the event of the financial failure of
the lessee.
B. Federal Securities Acts
The Securities Act of 1933 automatically exempts any security
issued or guaranteed by any state, or any political subdivision
thereof or any instrumentality of one or more states.'2 The original
act limited the exemption for public instrumentalities to those "exer-
cising an essential governmental function."2 6 However, this limitation
was deleted in a 1934 amendment which indicated that Congress
intended the exemption to be liberally applied to municipal securities.
121. 49 Stat. 1475 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 103(a) (9) (1964).
122. 52 Stat. 893 (1938), 11 U.S.C. 602 (1964) (reorganization); 52 Stat. 910
(1938), 11 U.S.C. § 753 (1964) (arrangement).
123. Annot., 129 A.L.R. 701, 715 (1940).
124. 52 Stat. 879 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 110(b) (1964).
125. 48 Stat. 74 (1933), 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a) (2) (1964).
126. Securities Act of 1933, §§ (a)(2), 48 Stat. 76, 15 U.S.C. § 78C (1964).
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According to the House committee report, the definition of a "political
subdivision" for purposes of the Securities Act should correspond with
the line drawn by the courts on the question of federal tax exemp-
tion.127 In general, the Commission has accepted the apparently
liberal intent of Congress and considers industrial development
bonds, including both revenue and general obligation bonds, to be
exempt from the requirements of the act.
128
The definition of an exempted security in the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 includes:
[Slecurities which are direct obligations of or obligations guaranteed as to
principal or interest by a State or any political subdivision thereof or any
agency or instrumentality of a State or any political subdivision thereof or
any municipal corporate instrumentality of one or more States.129
A liberal construction has been given to the term "direct obligations"
as used in this act, and the Commission considers state and municipal
revenue bonds to be exempt.130 Municipal securities are also exempt
from filing under the Trust Indenture Act of 1939.131
C. The Negotiable Instruments Law and the
Uniform Commercial Code
The Negotiable Instruments Law provides that an order or promise
to pay out of a particular fund is not an unconditional promise, and,
under this limitation, any revenue bond would not be a negotiable
instrument.132 Undoubtedly recognizing this limitation, most of the
enabling acts covering municipal industrial development bonds
include a specific provision declaring that the bonds shall be nego-
tiable instruments. 3 3 In some states, the NIL was modified to
provide that obligations of the state or any political subdivision shall
be negotiable even though payable out of a particular fund.134
The latter modification was one of the few changes in the earlier
Negotiable Instruments Law made by the Uniform Commercial Code.
Under the Code, a promise or order is not made conditional by the
fact that it is limited to payment out of a particular fund or the
proceeds of a particular source if the instrument is issued by a govern-
127. H.R. RP'. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1933).
128. 1 Loss SEcuRm1s REGULATION 563-64 (2d ed. 1961).
129. A8Stat- 74- (1933), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a) (12) (1964).
130. 2 Loss, op. cit. supra note 128, at 798.
131. 53 Stat. 1153 (1939), 15 U.S.C. § 77ddd(a)(4) (1964).
132. UNn tomu NEGOT.ABLE INSTRUMENTs LAv § 3; 43 Am. Jun. Public Securities
and Obligations § 163 (1942).
133. See, e.g., Ky. R v. STAT. § 103,230,(1963); Miss. CODE ANN. § 8936-59 (Supp.
1964).
134. TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-103 (1956).
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ment or governmental agency or unit.13 In any Code state, however,
a regular issue of industrial development bonds should come under
Article 8-"Investment Securities." This article specifically provides
that all securities governed by its provisions are negotiable instru-
ments.136
D. Eminent Domain
While more properly a part of the discussion of constitutional law,
one might well ponder the question of whether the theory supporting
the use of industrial development bonds could be extended to allow
the municipality to acquire a plant site under its power of eminent
domain. In a Maryland case upholding the issuance of general obli-
gation bonds, the dissenting judge felt that the term "public purpose"
was equivalent in the law of taxation and the law of eminent domain;
and that the majority opinion would, in effect, authorize a city to
exercise the power of eminent domain for industrial development.
Thus, if A owned a parcel of land on which he proposed to erect
a shoe factory, could the parcel be condemned and leased to B for
the erection of a shirt factory?137 With this unhappy possibility
suggested, it would not be too difficult to picture the cold hand of
Uriah Heep reaching out of a Dickensian law office to tap the
shoulder of any owner of a desirable industrial site.
It is, however, generally accepted that the power of condemnation
is the most severely restricted and guarded power of any government.
The statutes and cases considering the power of taxation generally
use the phrase "public purpose" or even "public benefit," while
those referring to the power of eminent domain use the more restric-
tive term "public use." No case has been found considering this
question under the laws authorizing industrial development bonds.138
The general law has been summarized as follows:
It may be taken as established law that the incidental benefit accruing to
the public from the establishment of a large factory, mill, department store,
or other industrial or commercial enterprise is not a valid ground for ranking
such an enterprise as a public use and intrusting it with the power of
acquiring a suitable site by eminent domain.139
135. UNwoI m ConmrEncrAL CODE § 3-105(1) (g).
136. UN IoR CoomcuAL CODE §§ 8-102(1) -105(1).
137. City of Frostburg v. Jenkins, 215 Md. 9, 19, 136 A.2d 852, 861 (1957)
(dissenting opinion).
138. Acquisition of specific industrial sites by condemnation is authorized by statute
in four states. Ky. BEv. STAT. § 103.245 (Supp. 1965); Miss. CODE ANN. § 8936-09
(1956); N.Y. PuBLIc AuaTisOR LAW § 1827 (Supp. 1965); TENN. CODE ANN. §
6-2819 (Supp. 1965). On the other hand, this use of the power of eminent domain
is prohibited in at least three enactments. IowA CODE ANN. § 419.14 (Supp. 1964);
MD. ANN. CODE, art. 41, § 266B (Supp. 1965); NEB. CoNsT. art. XV, § 16.
139. 18 Am. Jur. Eminent Domain § 45 (1938).
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Somewhat related cases are those considering the constitutionality
of the urban redevelopment laws, which authorize the acquisition of
slum areas through condemnation, and the resale or leasing of the
cleared property to private enterprise for industrial and commercial
purposes. These statutes have been enacted in almost every state
on the impetus of modem municipal needs and the financial assistance
available from the federal government. 40 They have been all but
unanimously upheld when attacked on constitutional grounds.141 While
these cases are sometimes described as exceptions to the rule that
private property cannot be condemned for only a "public benefit,"
they could be classified as an exercise of the state's police power rather
than the power of eminent domain.
Another limitation on any municipality's right to condemn property
for an industrial building site would be the principle that land may
not be taken by eminent domain for an indirect public benefit where
the proposed use is not limited to a particular location.142 One au-
thority in this field has made the obvious suggestion that the use of
tax money to aid private industry can be distinguished from the
power of eminent domain on grounds of public repugnancy.143 The
use of tax money is a much more impersonal affair than the taking
of private property. While the average citizen may well rebel at
the latter thought, he has undoubtedly come to expect increasingly
novel expenditures from the public till.'
44
VII. CMTuCISMS AND PLAUDITS
The use of industrial development bonds has been the subject of
considerable controversy in financial as well as in economic and legal
circles. Frequent reference is made to the disastrous consequences
that attended the extension of municipal credit to developing railroad
and transportation companies, a practice that was prevalent in the
mid-nineteenth century. The bonds, as such, have been officially
criticized by the Investment Bankers Association of America, the
Municipal Finance Officers Association, and the Municipal Law
Section of the American Bar Association. 145 In an appearance before
140. Housing Act of 1949, 63 Stat. 413, 12 U.S.C. § 1701h (1964); Housing Act
of 1954, tit. III, 68 Stat. 622, 12 U.S.C. § 1716 (1964); Area Redevelopment Act of
1961, 75 Stat. 47, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1441-64, 2501-25 (1964).
141. Compare Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954), with Edens v. City of
Columbia, 228 S.C. 563, 91 S.E.2d 280 (1956). Annot., 44 A.L.R.2d 1414 (1955).
142. Annot., 54 A.L.R. 7, 28 (1928).
143. 2 NicHoLs, EmiNENT DoMArN § 7.61 (3d ed. 1963).
144. For a decision very close in point wherein the attempted condemnation was
held unconstitutional,. see Hogue v. Port of Seattle, 54 Wash. 2d 799, 341 P.2d 171
(1959).
145. INVESTMENT BANKERS AssocLAToN or AMERICA, REPORT ON INDUSTRIAL AID
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the House Committee on Ways and Means,_ the,,director of research
for the Textile Workers Union of America-emphasized the "evil of
plant pirating."14 A principal criticism has been that the use of
municipal bonds in aid of private industry is an abuse of the tax
exemption for municipal securities that could lead Congress and
possibly the Supreme Court to take another look at the general
exemption afforded.
Other critical observations have pointed out the potential unfair-
ness to a competing industry. It has also been suggested that even in
the field of revenue bonds, a municipality may expose itself to liability
for negligence and related matters.147 The unhappy experience of
Springfield, Tennessee in defaulting on its contract to purchase an
industrial site is one example,' " but the instances of such liability
should be very rare.
Sharp reprimands have also appeared in judicial opinions. The
Supreme Court of Florida felt that any form of public financing of
private enterprise would be an encroachment on our constitutional
system that "will lead inevitably to the ultimate destruction of the
private enterprise system." The Nebraska court termed the use of
bonds "a death blow to the private enterprise system." After that
decision had been overridden by constitutional amendment, the
same court referred to the enabling legislation as a "sham." In Ala-
bama where the bonds were upheld, a dissenting judge felt that "the
present drift is leading to socialism."
On the other hand, the Kentucky Court of Appeals termed the
enabling statute an "ingenious plan." In approving that state's revenue
bond act, the Supreme Court of Tennessee quoting from an early
decision said: "[I]t may be asked, is there anything wrong in this?
Is there anything against the public good in this? Is there anything
against law in this? Surely not."
Describing the bonds as "the most effective technique yet devised
for rebuilding local economy," one writer summed up most of the
pro arguments as follows:
The primary public purpose served by industrial aicLbonds is the increase
in employment as workers are hired to staff the new plant. A second
advantage flows to business generally as increased payrolls circulate in the
community. Public morale and private incentive are enhanced, civic pride
is reawakened, and real estate values (and tax rolls) are stabilized and
FINANCING (1961). However, this opinion is not unanimous. See GOODBODY & CO.,
INDUSTRIA.L REVNUE BONDS, A FRANK DISCUSSION (1962); MoRE ABOUT INDUSTRIAL
REVENuE BONDS, A CALL FOR REmM (1963).
146. CoMwDm, op. cit. supra note 100, at 733-34.
147. Fordham, Revenue Bond Sanctions, 42 COLum. L.. REv. 395 (1942).
148. See note 84 supra and accompanying text.
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enlarged: Industry begets industry, moreover, and satellite plants often
spring up to meet the needs of the acquired manufacturer.
149
Referring to twenty years of experience in his state, a Mississippi
attorney concluded: "Whatever criticisms may be made concerning
Mississippi's BAWl laws, one thing is certain and that is, it works."1 0
VIII. CoNcLusIoN
Like any other tool available to city and financial planners, indus-
trial development bonds can be either wisely employed or severely
abused. An outstanding example of an abuse would be the purchase
and leaseback of an existing facility-of what avail is this endeavor
in providing new employment opportunities? 151 The potential of a
form of blackmail is also involved. What are the city fathers to do
when an existing industry suggests that it may relocate unless pro-
vided with a new, municipally financed plant?152 Consider also the
possibility of two existing and competing enterprises vying with
the local administration for the advantage of public financing. The
financial strength of one such industry may well support the bond
sale while the other would not.
The constitutional arguments and the basic theory of the enabling
legislation should be constantly kept in mind by all parties con-
cerned. State governments could undertake studies of the experience
in this field and make whatever changes in their own laws appear
warranted. Considering the rapid growth that has occurred, the
establishment of a permanent state board with regulatory authority
may be advisable in every state where the use of such bonds has
been authorized. Even if such a board functioned only in an advisory
capacity, it may well render valuable assistance to the municipalities
in the preparation of the legal documents and in several other areas.'53
Consideration might also be given to the repeal of legislation authoriz-
ing the use of general obligation bonds. While such bonds possibly
149. Note, 15 U. FLA. L. REv. 262, 296 (1962).
150. Bell, Legal Problems That May Be Encountered in the Administration of
Mississippi's BAWl Program, 29 Miss. L.J. 22,40 (1957).
151. However, the acquisition of any existing building has been upheld. Massey
v. City of Franklin, 384 S.W.2d 505 (Ky. 1964). In what appears to be special pur-
pose legislation, the West Virginia act provides that the bonds may be delivered in
exchange for an existing industrial plant. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 1093(28) (Supp. 1965).
Contra, ME. REv. STAT. ANN. ch. 30, § 5331.2 (Supp. 1965).
152. This possibility may have been invited by a 1961 amendment to the Tennessee
act which authorizes the use of municipal financing to induce industry "to locate in
or remain in this state." TENN. CODE ANN. § 6-2802 (Supp. 1965). (Emphasis added.)
153. At least one statute contains such a provision. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. ch. 30,
§ 5328.2 (Supp. 1965). See Note, 70 YALE L.J. 789 (1961).
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merit a smaller interest cost, this would seem to be far outweighed by
the potential disadvantages involved.
Certainly, a city should hesitate to consider any enterprise that could
not be carried by the credit of the proposed lessee.lM In addition to
the basic financial terms, the lessor's representatives should be very
much concerned with the remainder of the lease. The mere presence
of a large, non-taxpaying corporation could become a political football
after the initial joy of acquiring a new industry has subsided. The
lessee should also recognize that it is entering-into a long term rela-
tionship, and that whatever initial advantage may be gained from an
overly liberal lease could be outweighed by subsequent develop-
ments. 55 Clearly, the underwriter has a major responsibility in de-
termining what type of "package" should be offered for sale. And
finally, every investor should carefully consider the purpose of the
issue and the terms of the instruments in addition to evaluating the
financial position of the lessee.
The censures leveled at the use of industrial development bonds
have emphasized the possible loss of the municipal tax exemption
and the potential of unfortunate defaults. Hopefully, such conse-
quences can be avoided through careful planning and the exercise
of a wise discretion. Even though not subscribing to the suggested
specter of socialism, the users, issuers, sellers and buyers of these
bonds should recognize that this device does at least tinker with the
norms of the private enterprise system. It is a long way from a small,
depression-born measure in Winona, Mississippi to the multi-million
dollar project in a large, already prosperous city.
APPENDIX
The year given with statutes and constitutional amendments
is the year of original enactment or adoption.
ALABAMA
Local Development Corporations:
ALA. CoDE tit. 37, §§ 815-30(1) (1949);
Opinion of the Justices, 254 Ala. 506, 49 So. 2d 175 (1950).
Revenue Bonds:
ALA. CoDE tit. 37, §§ 511(20)-(32) (1951);
Newberry v. City of Andalusia, 257 Ala. 49, 57 So. 2d 629 (1952).
154. The lessee's credit resources and operational experience were considered in
Gripentrog v. -City of Wahpeton, 126 N.W.2d 230 (N.D. 1964), where the court stated
that such arguments should be addressed to the city council and not to the court.




Limited General Obligation Bonds:
Arx. CONST. amend. 49 (1958) (self-executing);
Myhand v. Erwin, 231 Ark. 444,330 S.W.2d 68 (1959).
Revenue Bonds:
Amx. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-1601 to -1614 (1960);
Wayland v. Snapp, 232 Ark. 57, 334 S.W.2d 633 (1960).
Joint Action of Two or More Subdivisions:
AEK. STAT. ANN. §§ 14-801 to -804 (1960);
Hackler v. Baker, 233 Ark. 690, 346 S.W.2d 677 (1961).
DELAW~AF
Local Development Corporations:
D L. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 7001-09 (1961);
Opinion of the Justices, 177 A.2d 205 (Del. 1962);
see text accompanying notes 72 & 73 supra.
See also note 98 supra.
GEORGIA
Revenue Bonds and Local Development Corporations:
Local Constitutional Amendments (see text accompanying notes 64-
66 supra-presumably could also cover general obligation bonds);
Smith v. State, 217 Ga. 94, 121 S.E.2d 113 (1961).
Local Development Corporations:




ILL. ANN. STAT., cb. 24, §§ 11-74-1 to -13 (Smith-Hurd 1951).
No reported case. A test cas.e brought prior to the required referen-
dum was held premature in Slack v. City of Salem, 31 Ill. 2d
174,201 N.E.2d 119 (1964).
IOWA
Revenue Bonds:
IowA CODE ANN. § §419.1-.14 (1963);
Green v. City of Mt. Pleasant, 131 N.W.2d 5 (Iowa 1964).
KANSAS
Revenue Bonds:
KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-1740 to -1749 (1961);






Ky. REv. STAT. §§ 103.200-.285 (1946);
Gregory v. City of Lewisport, 369 S.W.2d 133 (Ky. 1963) (covers
several specific questions);
Dyche v. City of London, 288 S.W.2d 648 (Ky. 1956) (approves tax
supported bonds under general constitution after election);




LA. CONST. art. 14, § 14 (b.2) (1952) (self-executing);
Miller v. Police Jury, 226 La. 8, 74 So. 2d 394 (1954).
Revenue Bonds:
ME. REv. STAT. ANN. ch. 30, §§ 5325-44 (1965);
Opinion of the Justices, 210 A.2d 683 (Me. 1965) (limited approval).
MA&RYLArND
General Obligation Bonds:
MD. ANN. CODE art. 45A, § § 1-3 (1960).
See City of Frostburg v. Jenkins, 215 Md. 9, 136 A.2d 852 (1957)
(upholding a 1953 private act)
Revenue Bonds:








Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 8936 to -24 (1936);
Albritton v. City of Winona, 181 Miss. 75, 178 So. 799, appeal dis-
missed, 303 U.S. 627 (1938).
Revenue Bonds:




Revenue and General Obligation Bonds:
Mo. CONST. art. 6, §§ 23(a), 27 (1960);
Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 71.790-.850 (1961);




NE_. CONST. art. XV, § 16 (1960);
NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 18-1614 to -1623 (1961);




N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 14-31-1 to -13 (1955);
Village of Deming v. Hosdreg Co., 62 N.M. 18, 303 P.2d 920 (1956).
NORTH DAKOTA
Revenue and General Obligation Bonds:
N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 40-57-01 to -20 (Revenue 1955, General Obliga-
tion 1961);




OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 62, § § 651-64 (1961);
Harrison v. Claybrook, 372 P.2d 602 (Okla. 1962).
SoUTH DAKOTA




TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 6-1701 to-1716 (1951);
Holly v. City of Elizabethton, 193 Tenn. 46,241 S.W.2d 1001 (1951).
General Obligation Bonds:
TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 6-2901 to -2916 (1955);





TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 6-2801 to -2820 (1955);








W. VA. CODE ANN. §9 1093(22)-(41) (1963);
State ex rel. County Court of Marion County v. Demus, 135 S.E.2d
352 (W. Va. 1964).
WYOMING
Revenue Bonds:
Wyo. STAT. ANN. §§ 15-628.16 to .24 (1963).
No reported case.
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